Trained anaesthetic assistants are considered essential for the safe conduct of anaesthesia. Data from 5837 AIMS (Anaesthetic Incident Monitoring Study) reports were evaluated for issues concerning anaesthetic assistants in the generation and resolution of anaesthetic incidents. "Inadequate assistance" as a contributing factor was identified in 187 reports, whilst "skilled assistance" which minimized the incident was present in 808 cases. One hundred and seventy-two reports specifically commented on anaesthetic assistants in the narrative section of the AIMS form. All surgical specialities were represented. In 147 of these reports the assistant actually contributed to or failed to assist with the incident. Although the majority of outcomes from the reports were uneventful, prolonged stay, awareness and ICU admission did ensue in a small number of cases. The most common incidents were related to problems with equipment, communication and inadequate staffing levels (number and/or skill mix). Results from this study have implications for anaesthetic assistant staffing levels and the orientation of course content.
Skilled assistance for the anaesthetist is a prerequisite for the safe and reliable conduct of anaesthesia, yet the training, background and competence of this group of practitioners varies widely 1, 2 . Assistants originate from either a nursing (registered or enrolled nurse) or paramedical (operating department assistant or technician) background. Despite their longstanding association with anaesthetists, few studies have looked specifically at anaesthetic related incidents from the perspective of the anaesthetic assistant.
The Anaesthetic Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS), which now has over 5837 reports in its database, provides a valuable source of information in the area of anaesthetic related adverse outcomes 3 . Results from AIMS have been important in the development of protocols, guidelines and the modification of anaesthetic equipment aimed at improving anaesthetic safety 4 . The aim of this study was to look at the contribution of anaesthetic assistants in the development and resolution of anaesthetic incidents as identified through the AIMS database.
METHODS
Of the 5837 incidents reported to AIMS, those which made reference to "assistant", "anaesthetic nurse" or "anaesthetic technician" in the narrative were extracted. In addition, the final section on the AIMS reporting form which indicated contributing and minimizing factors was also reviewed. This included tick boxes with "inadequate assistance" and "skilled assistance" in the contributing and minimizing factors section respectively. Each incident form was reviewed and relevant information was entered into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet (Microsoft Corporation, Seattle, U.S.A.). Data were entered as originally recorded on the individual AIMS reports. Data were analysed for the following fields: surgical type, surgical category, phase of anaesthesia which incident occurred, initial and final outcome, qualification of assistant, suggested corrective strategies and reasons the assistant contributed to and/or minimized the incident. Reasons for the assistant contributing to/failing to alleviate the incident, or minimizing the incident, were grouped into individual categories.
RESULTS
When the whole database (5837 reports) was examined for factors which contributed to or minimized the incident, inadequate assistance contributed to/failed to alleviate the incident in 187 (3.2%) reports whilst skilled assistance which minimized the incident occurred in 808 (18.8%) reports. Tables 1  and 2 show the effects of assistance in relation to other contributing/minimizing factors reported to the AIMS database.
Two hundred and fifty-five reports were extracted which had "assistant", "anaesthetic nurse" or "technician" in the narrative from the 5837 AIMS reports. Of these, 172 reports were suitable for subsequent analysis. Rejected forms contained the appropriate key words, but the documented incident did not relate directly to the anaesthetic assistant. Subsequent data interpretation involves these 172 reports from which narrative was available for interpretation. The individual totals do not always add up to 172 due to incomplete documentation of data on the AIMS form. The majority of reports (148) using the above key words suggested that assistants either contributed to the development of the incident or failed to help during the incident. In 24 cases, respondents suggested that the assistant minimized the incident. Incidents covered the whole range of anaesthetic responsibility. The type of cases involved in the report included cardiac surgery 6, cardioversion 2, dental surgery 8, emergency department procedure 1, ENT surgery 12, ophthalmic surgery 6, general surgery 40, gynaecological surgery 9, haematology 1, multiple procedures 1, neurosurgery 11, obstetrics 8, oral surgery 3, orthopaedic surgery 18, paediatric surgery 9, plastic surgery 7, electroconvulsive therapy 2, radiology 2, thoracic surgery 2, urology 8 and vascular surgery 10. Incidents involving anaesthetic assistants occurred in 119 elective cases, 51 emergency cases and in two reports the type of procedure was not recorded. Although events occurred during all phases of anaesthesia, the preinduction and induction times were associated with the majority of incidents ( Figure  1 ). Most initial and final outcomes from these incidents were uneventful, but a small number resulted in important morbidity (Tables 3 and 4 ). Examples are shown below which are representative of each outcome. penicillin and subsequently administered by the anaesthetist who thought it was the antibiotic. This resulted in a short period of ventricular tachycardia (VT). Cardiac arrest. One case of severe bradycardia/ sinus arrest which was not picked up early due to delayed application of monitoring by the assistant. In another situation, prior to going onto cardiopulmonary bypass, the patient developed VT. There was no immediate assistance available to the anaesthetist to help with going onto emergency bypass.
Final outcome
Prolonged stay. Heparin flush was made up with 1000 units/ml instead of 10 units/ml for invasive monitoring for major ENT procedure. The patients had to be admitted to ICU overnight for reversal of coagulopathy.
Awareness. An assistant gave an ampoule of suxamethonium to the anaesthetist instead of pethidine. This was given inadvertently by the attending anaesthetist resulting in awareness.
ICU admission. An inexperienced assistant helped with a rapid sequence induction, which resulted in passive regurgitation and aspiration past ineffective cricoid pressure, which necessitated ICU admission.
The most important corrective strategies suggested by the reporter are shown in Table 5 . The majority of these strategies relate to improvement in equipment, communication and/or manpower. When the data were examined in detail, specific reasons that contributed to the incident reflected limitations with equipment and training ( give a drug intravenously, slow to attach monitoring 1) b (Wrong dose 2, wrong drug given 2 [syntocinon instead of suxamethonium; thrombostat instead of heparin], wrong drug prepared 8 [antibiotic reconstituted in 2% lignocaine; bupivacaine 0.5% instead of 0.25%; pethidine/fentanyl swap; mixture of opioids prepared; 120 mg ampoule of morphine prepared and given instead of 15 mg; POR8 injected instead of syntocinon; 120 mg morphine given instead of 100 µg fentanyl; suxamethonium given instead of pethidine) c PCA chart completed incorrectly by anaesthetic assistant. 
Number of incidents
Timing of incident that vaporizer and circuit problems specifically were the most common causes of equipment-related problems. Reasons for the assistant minimizing the incident are shown in Table 8 whilst the skill level of the assistant is shown in Figure 2 .
DISCUSSION
Results of this study suggest that anaesthetic assistants play an important role in the prevention and generation of incidents in the perioperative period. However, it would appear that there might be some deficiencies in overall staffing levels and training requirements, especially in the area of equipment preparation.
Inadequate assistance was ranked as fourteenth on the list of contributing factors involved with the incident. This compared with the fourth place that "skilled assistance" played in the resolution of the incident. This may reflect a degree of reporting bias, as respondents may be less likely to implicate a colleague as a contributing factor than consider them a benefit. Despite this, in around one in 15 reports submitted to AIMS, the specific role of the anaesthetic assistant was noted, with the majority of reports supporting the role of skilled assistants in reducing the impact of the incident.
Incidents were spread throughout all the different surgical specialties as well as in areas outside the operating rooms. Despite written guidelines dealing with assistance for the anaesthetist in these areas 1, 5, 6 , it is obvious at times that the competence and training of some assistants is less than ideal. Areas that have historically lacked adequate facilities and staffing (e.g. ECT 7 , radiology, cardioversion, obstetrics and dental surgery) are represented in the present study. In a study looking at problems encountered when administering general anaesthesia within emergency departments in the United Kingdom, 71% of anaesthetists felt more apprehensive working there, 68% felt that their assistance was inadequate and only 28% had a trained assistant present for the procedure 8 . Moreover given the predominance of elective surgery performed compared to emergency surgery, incidents involving emergency surgery are probably overreported in this study. Whilst numerator data is hard to interpret, this may reflect reduced staffing levels in emergency out of hours situations, or the use of less well trained assistants during these periods. The preponderance of incidents around induction reflects a time of maximum anaesthetic- related activity. However the spread of incidents throughout the other phases up to recovery also highlights the continued need for assistants to be readily available at all times.
As an incident is defined as "any event which caused, or had the potential to cause, an adverse event", it is not surprising that the initial and final outcomes were insignificant in the majority of cases. Yet, an important number of serious events were directly attributed to inadequate assistance. These included awareness (wrong drugs prepared and/or administered), ICU admission and prolonged stay. In several instances, there was a combination of errors between the assistant and anaesthetist.
There is no category in the AIMS form to define the training or background of the assistant, hence in a large number of reports the "competence" of the assistant could not be assessed. Despite this in over one third of reports, the assistant was described by the reporter to be "inexperienced". It is unclear whether the degree of competence was known to the attending anaesthetist before starting the case, or became evident after the incident. In some cases no assistant was available to the anaesthetist. This clearly breaches guidelines set out by some Colleges 1 . In reality, this type of scenario does occur, and cases are often undertaken with no untoward effects. Reassuring as this might be, we are all too aware of medico-legal cases that have involved equipment malfunction generated by a cascade of critical incidents. Although difficult to prove retrospectively, the presence of trained and competent staff might have either prevented the incident or allowed a successful crisis management protocol to be followed.
The specific corrective strategies suggested by the reporters emphasized the importance of an adequate and comprehensive equipment check, adequate staffing and communication. This has implications for the training of assistants. Historically, theory has combined with practical on-the-job experience, but objective assessment of practical experience is difficult to establish. Assistants do not have reliable access to anaesthetic simulators, which are a relatively new concept in anaesthesia training. Competence-based training, although ideal in theory, is difficult to control, quantify and evaluate, especially in practical clinical (e.g. difficult intubation, application of cricoid pressure) or equipment (e.g. troubleshooting machine faults) related areas. Similarly, the areas that warrant urgent attention include improved communication in the operating room and increased personnel numbers. There have been moves in various areas to consolidate operating room per-sonnel and "multiskill" operating room staff. Whilst this model has theoretical merits, the rapid turnover of operating room staff, infrequent exposure to anaesthetic techniques and less frequent exposure to difficult scenarios mean that in times of crisis, the assistants may not have the required skills to cope. The quest for improved outcomes, patient satisfaction and safety mandate that we continue to improve our practice further.
Can we then make any recommendations from these data? As with any interpretation of qualitative data, we are limited by the unstructured nature of the AIMS reports, subjective reporting and bias. Despite these limitations, some issues can be raised.
Firstly, there is little doubt that in many institutions, anaesthetics are administered with a paucity of trained assistants. Moreover, inadequately trained operating room personnel can cause adverse outcomes. Anaesthetists need to continue to pursue the goal for the availability of trained assistants at every location where anaesthesia is carried out.
Secondly, issues on training need to be addressed. Equipment familiarization and trouble shooting, along with knowledge of anaesthetic drugs need to be emphasized. Equipment manufacturers and anaesthetists are currently reviewing specifics of circuitry and/or vaporizer safety. This area may need further emphasis during anaesthetic assistant training, both from a theoretical and practical viewpoint. Importantly, the attending anaesthetist should have picked up many of the problems identified during these reports. Attention should be redirected towards a more formalized equipment checking regimen. Although generally unpopular, this type of checking occurs as a standard within other "high tech" areas, e,g, the aviation industry, and such written protocols have been suggested in the past for use in anaesthesia. Interestingly, it has been suggested that nurses/technicians may adhere to guidelines, e.g. checking the anaesthetic machine more closely than physicians 9 . Thirdly clinical skills such as cricoid pressure, difficult intubation and airway management need to be objectively evaluated. It can be argued that the use of appropriate anaesthetic simulators may need to be extended for use by the whole operating room team including assistants and operating room nurses. Finally the theoretical component of the training needs reappraisal. It has been noted that there is little ongoing continuing medical education for operating room nurses and technicians 10 . This needs to be encouraged at departmental, hospital and national levels.
In summary, data from AIMS has shown the importance of adequately trained anaesthetic assistants. They can provide a benefit to anaesthetists and patients, however reduction of staffing levels and inexperienced assistants can actually generate incidents. Improved training with greater emphasis on the practical components of the job may help in further improving this area of anaesthetic care.
